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Abstract. The burgeoning technology of Mobile Edge Computing is 
attracting the traditional LBS and LS to deploy due to its nature characters 
such as low latency and location awareness. Although this transplant will 
avoid the location privacy threat from the central cloud provider, there still 
exists the privacy concerns in the LS of MEC scenario. Location privacy 
threat arises during the procedure of the fingerprint localization, and the 
previous studies on location privacy are ineffective because of the different 
threat model and information semantic. To address the location privacy in 
MEC environment, we designed LoPEC, a novel and effective scheme for 
protecting location privacy for the MEC devices. By the proper model of 
the RAN access points, we proposed the noise-addition method for the 
fingerprint data, and successfully induce the attacker from recognizing the 
real location. Our evaluation proves that LoPEC effectively prevents the 
attacker from obtaining the user's location precisely in both single-point 
and trajectory scenarios. 
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1. Introduction 
Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) is a new technology which is currently being 
standardized in an ETSI Industry Specification Group (ISG) of the same name. Mobile 
Edge Computing provides an IT service environment and cloud-computing capabilities at 
the edge of the mobile network, within the Radio Access Network (RAN) and near mobile 
subscribers. The aim is to reduce latency, ensure highly efficient network operation and 
service delivery, and offer an improved user experience.The growth of mobile traffic and 
pressure on costs are driving a need to implement several changes in order to maintain 
quality of experience, the Internet of Things (IoT) is further congesting the network and 
network operators need to do local analysis to ease security and backhaul impacts [1]. 
Among all of the pervasive mobile and cloud-based services, the location-based 
service (LBS) and the localization service (LS) are the most suitable services for the 
decentralized deployment of the MEC scenario. On on hand, MEC is characterized by 
low latency, proximity and location awareness [2], these features of MEC are naturally fit 
with LBS and LS. On the other hand, in the vast majority of instances, the LBS and LS 
can be provided inside each subarea of MEC community independently, since most of the 
location-based information (e.g. the kNN queries, POI in proximity) are contained in the 
MEC scenario, data could be collected and processed based on location without being 
transported to cloud, this will block the LBS and LS provider from getting the location of 
user, which will preserve the location privacy better. 
However, from the view of privacy preservation, in MEC scenario, the concern on 
the location privacy still exists. Although the location is avoided from being sent to the 
centralized cloud, the different threat model in MEC scenario is, to some extent, 
threatening the location privacy. As shown in Fig.1, two main factors are involved in the 
MEC scenario. 
First, in the traditional threat model of centralized LBS service, the privacy concerns 
are originated from the geolocation information, and the preservation efforts are focusing 
on preventing the LBS providers from knowing the user's accurate locations while at the 
same time retaining the LBS functionality and service quality. However, in MEC scenario, 
such threat model is inapplicable, since the location awareness MEC is capable of 
generating location from the wireless signal space "fingerprint". In MEC scenario, this 
fingerprint is equivalent to the location from the view of privacy-preserving, and the 
fingerprint of user needs to be protected. 
Second, the basis of the MEC infrastructure is constructed by the edge smart devices 
with limited computational power and with well-known lacking of security. As a result, 
although the centralized LBS providers which are considered to be untrusted (or curious-
but-honest) are excluded, the privacy concerns due to the weak security of infrastructure 
is still severe. 
In conclusion, we argue that the location privacy preservation in the MEC scenario 
should be performed in the very beginning of the generation of locations. The fingerprint 
information needs to be protected since it is equivalent to the location in MEC scenario. 
However, most of the state-of-the-art research on location privacy protection focuses on 
solving the privacy threat against LBS providers by investigating how to use the location 
safely or in a privacy-preserving way, they are incapable for the MEC scenario since the 
semantic content of wireless signal space fingerprint is different from the geolocation 
coordinates. 
In this paper, we investigated the location privacy preservation in MEC scenario, and 
proposed a noise addition-based scheme named LoPEC to protect the fingerprint 
information of user. Specifically, we introduce the fundamental topology model of the 
MEC wireless infrastructures, based on this model, we designed a method to generate the 
"noise fingerprint". Then, the noise addition scheme was given to protect fingerprint of 
the user. We consider the trajectory privacy and propose an enhanced algorithm, which 
can further generate trajectory-like noise fingerprints when using continuous location 
updates. To realize our scheme on smart devices directly without any additional system 
architectures, we propose a mechanism for the daily collection of a noise fingerprint 
candidate set. This mechanism also greatly enlarges the selectable range of noise 
fingerprint and enables the user to generate noise fingerprint beyond his current sensing 
range in real time. 
 
Fig.1 LBS and LS in MEC scenario. 
Our approach has no negative impact on the functionality of the upper LBSs. The 
evaluation we implemented on Android device verified the effectiveness while 
maintaining a reasonable time cost for today's devices. 
This paper makes the following main contributions. 
(1) We propose a method for adding noise that can confuse the potential attackers 
and prevent it from recognizing the user's location in MEC scenario. The protection level 
can be adjusted according to the degree of the threat. With our method, the noise 
fingerprint does not reduce the usability of the real location and has no impact on the LBS 
functionality. 
(2) We use a light-weight and realistic system architecture for the MEC environment. 
No unrealistic assumption or multi-party cooperation is needed. Our scheme can be 
realized directly in modern smart devices and the mobile internet ecosystem. 
(3) We consider both single-spot positioning privacy and trajectory privacy and 
ensures, through the use of the noise fingerprint, that the attacker will generate trajectory-
like locations that are not easy to decipher by committing a homogeneity attack [3]. 
(4) LoPEC provides an optimization algorithm based on the raw noise-generating 
method and drastically reduces the computational costs. This feature is meaningful 
because energy use is an important concern with mobile devices. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly reviews the related 
work. Section III outlines the preliminaries of LoPEC. We describe the design details of 
LoPEC in Section IV. Section V and Section VI provide theoretical analyses and 
experimental evaluations. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper. 
2. Related work 
Approaches on location privacy can be divided into two categories: LBS scenarios and 
LS scenarios. 
2.1 Approaches to the LBS scenario (how to use safely) 
Much attention has been paid to this location privacy scenario in the past decade. Most 
approaches to this scenario were surveyed comprehensively in [3][4][5][6][7]. 
The threat models of these approaches are more or less similar. They prefer treating 
the LBS providers as the most untrusted adversaries with extensive background 
knowledge. Based on this framework, their primary purpose is to prevent the LBS 
providers from knowing the user's accurate locations while at the same time retaining the 
LBS functionality and service quality as much as possible. 
Many ingenious methods have been adopted successfully in these approaches, such 
as dummy adding, k-anonymity, obfuscation, region cloaking, caching and encryption-
based methods. Although they have different ideologies and realization details, these 
approaches share the same understanding of the scenario boundary; they do not care how 
a location is obtained. The mobile user first obtains a known and definite location, and 
then their approaches are applied. 
In MEC scenario, the LS providers (LP), who are as untrustworthy as the LBS 
providers, suffer from the same privacy threat concerns. The location privacy needs to be 
protected even before the location is generated. However, these approaches can neither 
protect location privacy against the LP because their threat model is incomplete, nor be 
applied to the MEC scenario directly because the communication contents as well as the 
semantics are different. 
2.2 Approaches to the MEC scenario (how to obtain 
safely) 
Compared to the LBS scenario, the situation in which the device requests the location 
from a LP is quite different. Several researchers have studied the problem in this scenario 
from different perspectives. 
Damiani and Cuijpers described this privacy issue in [9] and tried to solve this 
problem by designing a policy control mechanism to adjust the granularity of the location 
determined by the LP. This approach is not a computational technique but rather a policy 
suggestion. 
[10] Described a location privacy threat called a location spoofing attack, in which 
the attackers can counterfeit the device’s original fingerprint information and imitate the 
real user to request the user's location from the LP. Then, the method proposes a reliability 
determination algorithm to cope with this threat. However, their threat model regarded the 
LP as trusted, which is unrealistic in the MEC scenario. 
Some encryption-based method such as [11] are also proposed to protect location 
privacy against the LP. However, the encryption procedure is too time-consuming for the 
lightweight edge devices and key management [12][13][14] is also a challenge. 
3. PRELIMINARIES 
In this section, we first introduce the assumptions on the system adopted in this paper 
using some basic concepts and then present the motivation for and the basic idea of our 
solution. 
3.1 System assumptions 
Our threat model is concise. We concentrate our research on the LS procedure in the MEC 
scenario, and we do not consider the location privacy problems of the LBS scenario. The 
LS providers are the most direct and shrewdest adversaries in our work. They may record 
people’s locations or even daily trajectories without permission. Moreover, we consider 
the communication channel between device and LP to be trusted since this channel can be 
well protected by security protocols. Furthermore, attacks by exploiting the vulnerabilities 
of the device’s operating system and programming framework [15][16] are beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
Second, multiple dominant positioning technologies are being utilized by today’s 
mainstream edge computing-based localizations, but we do not assume on what specific 
technology may be adopted by LS providers because our scheme is designed based on the 
fundamental principles of the vast majority of those technologies. 
Finally, we treat the RAN access points (APs) as the only communication 
infrastructure adopted by the LP. This assumption is rational because state-of-the-art 
technologies mainly rely on the RAN APs (e.g. Wifi hotspots) to achieve meter-level 
positioning accuracy; other infrastructures such as cellular towers are only subsidiaries. 
However, our approach can be simply transplanted to other infrastructures such as cell 
towers because their basic positioning fundamentals are almost the same. 
3.2 Limitations 
Our goal is for our scheme to possess strong suitability for today's positioning 
technologies rather than apply to one specific positioning technology; we also want it to 
be realistic. This goal imposes the following limitations: 
1. LoPEC cannot rely on the technical details of any positioning technology; and 
2. LoPEC cannot perform any modification of existing positioning technologies. 
To accommodate these limitations, we implement LoPEC on the device side. This 
approach can also simplify the design complexity of LoPEC because no matter what 
positioning technology the LP adopts, the user's job during the positioning process 
remains almost the same: sense the APs in proximity and transmit them to the LP 
(Fig.2(a)). 
As we noted in Section 1, our basic idea is to use a noise-addition method to prevent 
the LP from knowing the user's accurate location. This idea is easy to implement in the 
LBS scenario because the location coordinate's semantic is uncomplicated and easy to 
simulate, even using the simplest randomization method, people can still ensure the 
equivalence between the real location and the noise one, all left people to do is to improve 
the noise fingerprint’s degree of similarity in other aspects. 
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Fig.2 Our basic idea of noise adding 
However, the same concept of noise addition is much more difficult to realize in the 
MEC scenario for the following two reasons: 
1. The noise fingerprint we need in the MEC scenario, i.e., the AP identifiers(Wi-Fi 
Mac addresses in this paper), must not only be homogeneous to real fingerprint but also 
should be understandable to the LP. As shown in Fig.2(b), if we use the fabrication method, 
which researchers used in the LBS scenario to manufacture dummies, the LPs can easily 
recognize the real fingerprint because the noise fingerprint does not exist in their databases. 
2. Even using real-world AP identifiers that can be handled by the LPs as our noise 
fingerprint, there is still an additional problem to be solved; Fig.2(c) illustrates this 
problem. According to the characteristics of smartphone sensing, the spatial distribution 
of the real APs should satisfy a special cluster-like pattern; more precisely, the coverage 
areas of APs in the actual fingerprint must overlap one another. The features of the 
distributions of the real fingerprint and the noise fingerprint ought to be the same, which 
makes adding the noise more difficult. 
3.3 Basic idea 
For the first problem, we will enable the user to possess a huge number of real-world AP 
identifiers as the candidate set of noise fingerprint. For practicability, we will not assume 
a third-party broker, which possess the entire region's AP identifiers, would handle this 
problem. This assumption is convenient for simplifying the problem but not realistic for 
the implementation. In this paper, based on the fact that a device can sense and record a 
considerable number of APs during daily activity and movement, we design a Self-Collect 
and Self-Organize Algorithm (SCSOA) for smartphones to collect APs as the candidate 
set of noise fingerprint (Section 4.2). 
For the second problem, we generate noise fingerprint with high similarity to the real 
fingerprint. Fig.2(d) shows this optimal case, when the noise fingerprint is difficult to 
distinguish. This process requires us to model the overlapping relations between APs in 
intuitive and predictable way and to make sure the smartphones can learn this model. 
We use an undigraph to characterize the spatial distribution and the overlapping 
relations between APs. We first simplify the irregular cover area of the APs to a circular 
area (Fig.3(a); this simplification does not affect our model's authenticity because it is 
only for convenience of the display). Then, we can model the APs’ spatial distribution as 
an undigraph G(V, E), in which Vertex(V) represents all APs in a region and Edge(E) 
represents the situation in which two APs in V have an overlapping relation in the spatial 
distribution. 
          
(a) Spatial distribution of APs with their "overlapping" (b)Modeling result based on our 
relations                                      rule 
Fig.3 Use undigraph to model APs spatial distribution 
Fig.3(b) illustrates the modeling result of the data shown in Fig.3(a). Note that G 
does not contain the geo-location coordinates of the APs; it only characterizes their spatial 
topology. Using this model, we see the overlapping spatial relations of the APs in real 
fingerprint can now be modeled as a complete subgraph in G. Then, with the help of G, 
we can generate noise fingerprint that has the same features as a real fingerprint; more 
specifically, we find some other complete subgraphs in G and use the corresponding APs 
as our noise fingerprint. 
Because the SCSOA can generate G for device iteratively while sensing and 
recording APs, whenever a user requests LS from the LP, we can calculate several 
complete subgraphs from G without assistance from another party. However, restricted by 
the high real-time performance and low energy consumption demands of the device, the 
raw graph traversal algorithm for complete subgraph discovery is too time-consuming to 
apply, especially when G is large. To overcome this problem, we propose a faster 
Complete Subgraph Discovery Algorithm (CSDA). CSDA is based on the notion of 
clustering coefficients. The clustering coefficient of a vertex in a graph quantifies how 
close its neighbors are to being a clique (complete graph). CSDA tends to find APs 
associated with high clustering coefficients and is an efficient method, as demonstrated in 
Section 4.3. 
Finally, we further consider the trajectory privacy in which the noise-addition 
method will suffer from the homogeneity attack. We protect against this threat by enabling 
the smartphones to generate noise fingerprint with continuous spatial distributions. Our 
basic idea is to find a complete subgraph adjacent to the previous one as best as we can 
(Section 4.4). 
4. OUR PROPOSED SCHEMES 
We first introduce an overview of our approach, and then we present our AP collection 
algorithm (SCSOA) and the noise fingerprint generation algorithm (CSDA) in detail. 
Finally, we present the enhanced CSDA (e-CSDA) for the trajectory scenario to defend 
against the homogeneity attack. 
4.1 System overview 
In our system, when a user requests LS in a fixed location, he first uses CSDA to generate 
several noise sets of APs as the noise fingerprint and then mixes them with the real sensed 
APs and sends them to the LP. CSDA runs on the undigraph G, which is created by 
SCSOA. SCSOA runs continuously in the background to collect APs and model G during 
the user's daily movements. It is evident that the longer this algorithm operates, the larger 
the undigraph G will be, which means a larger set of noise candidates and better privacy 
protection. 
When the user is in the trajectory scenario (e.g., using a navigation LBS), the system 
will activate the e-CSDA to generate noise fingerprint with continuous spatial distribution 
to further strengthen the privacy protection. 
4.2 SCSOA for APs collection 
Inspired by the relationship between the APs’ spatial distribution and their corresponding 
undigraph model, we can assert that given a set of APs with known spatial distribution 
and their undigraph G, if a user senses his surrounding APs, denoted as APreal, then the 
vertices in G corresponding to APreal must constitute a complete subgraph. 
 
Fig.4 Basic idea of SCSOA, user travels from T1 to T5 along the path shown as the 
black arrow and uses SCSOA to collect APs and generates G each time he senses 
some new APs 
Based on this feature, our main concept is to construct a complete subgraph and 
merge it with the existing undigraph each time the user senses and records his surrounding 
APs. By repeating this step, the user can construct a large enough undigraph for noise 
fingerprint generation; see Fig.4. Algorithm 1 details this process. 
 
In real-world situations, an AP’s signal strength may vary with time and environment 
and hence make its cover area unstable, especially in the boundary area. To improve G's 
authenticity, we use a thresholdτof signal strength to filter out those unstable overlapping 
relations. We first let V absorb the newly discovered APs, and then we add an edge into E 
selectively, according toτ: an edge will be in E if the signal strengths of both of its two 
vertices are greater thanτ. Note that largerτwill lead to a higher authenticity of G but a 
smaller number of candidates for noise fingerprint. 
SCSOA enables the user to construct an undigraph model of real-world APs as the 
candidate pool for noise generation. It also makes it possible for the user to implement 
LoPEC on his own, without any third-party participation. This capability further improves 
our system’s practicality. 
4.3 CSDA for noise-data generation 
Our goal is to find a complete subgraph from G. This problem can be classified as a Clique 
Problem. However, the brute-force algorithm for finding a clique in an undigraph is too 
time-consuming for the LS scenario. Although this brute-force search can be improved by 
using more efficient algorithms, all of these algorithms require exponential time to solve 
the problem [17]. This requirement limits the utilization of this technique in our system 
in cases where G is large. 
We solved this issue by dividing the whole problem into two phases. First, we 
determine the clustering coefficient c of each vertex in G and record the coefficients 
during the user's idle time (i.e., when the user is not in the LS scenario). As c can describe 
the closeness of a vertex's neighbors, the neighbors of a vertex with higher c are more 
likely to constitute a complete subgraph (with the edges between them); when ci, we can 
be sure that vi and all its neighbors would be perfect candidates for use as noise fingerprint. 
Based on this feature, in the second phase (LS scenario), we adopt a randomization 
method to select noise fingerprint near the vertices with very high c (approximately 1). 
Algorithm 2 describes the details of this method. 
 
We use those vertices with c higher than a threshold ϵ as the pointers to the dense 
areas of G. In this way, we avoid those time-consuming deterministic algorithms and 
perform a randomize method instead. We first randomly locate h dense areas in G and 
then randomly select several vertices as the noise fingerprint set in each area. Here, we 
further consider the fact that the number of APs in APreal may be different each time the 
user requests LS because of the unstable signal environment. Therefore, to reinforce the 
indistinguishability, the noise fingerprint must not only constitute a complete subgraph in 
G but must also contain the same number of vertexes as APreal. Thus, we will deprecate 
those vertices with fewer neighbors than the real fingerprint. 
Benefitting from the two-phase design and the randomization, CSDA can generate 
noise fingerprint far faster than deterministic algorithms. Furthermore, by randomly 
locating dense areas in G, CSDA can ensure the even distribution of the noise fingerprint 
selection from the probabilistic perspective, and randomly choosing vertices from the 
dense area will enrich the diversity of the noise candidates. 
Note that CSDA will sometimes generate a false noise fingerprint set (i.e., not a 
complete subgraph in G) due to the situation when the coefficient c of the pointer vertex 
(in Vh) is not 1. However, this situation occurs with very small probability, and, as we 
show in our evaluation, this probability can be quantifiably controlled by adjusting ϵ. 
Because the SCSOA functions continuously, this probability will be further reduced. 
4.4 e-CSDA for the trajectory scenario 
We take into consideration the trajectory privacy in which the attacker (LP) can carry out 
a homogeneity attack to identify the user's real location. The homogeneity attack is mainly 
based on the fact that in a continuous LS request process, the locations should be 
homogenous with each other in spatial distribution. The attacker can distinguish the real 
user from the low-homogeneity noise fingerprint. 
We enhance the CSDA and use noise fingerprint that possesses the trajectory-like 
spatial distribution to overcome this problem. Algorithm 3 illustrates this enhancement. 
 
We use the vertex adjacent to the last generated noise fingerprint as the start of our 
algorithm instead of using randomization every time. In this way, we can generate noise 
fingerprint neighboring the previous noise fingerprint. This process is rational because, 
although G does not contain the spatial information of the APs, two adjacent APs in G are 
very likely to be close to each other in the general case. 
5. ANALYSIS 
We provide our privacy metric to measure how much privacy our system can offer during 
an LS process. Then, we discuss several security issues. 
5.1 Privacy metric 
The number of noise fingerprint has been widely adopted as the privacy metric in noise 
addition-based approaches that are not restricted to location privacy protection. In our 
system, the number of noise fingerprint represents how many APs we use to mix with the 
real APs. These noise fingerprint are used to generate fake locations for the LP; therefore, 
we use the number of locations that can be determined using the noise fingerprints as our 
privacy metric, which can be defined as 
kH
n
  
Here, H denotes our privacy metric, k denotes the total number of noise APs, and n is the 
number of APs in the real fingerprint. According to our noise-generation algorithms, H 
will always be an integer, and higher H provides a higher privacy degree. 
5.2 Security discussion 
As we noted in Section 3.1, the LP can determine the user's location during the LS process. 
In our system, the noise-addition method generates high-similarity noises, which means 
that (1) these noise APs are all obtained from the real-world collection and (2) the LP can 
use these noises to calculate locations in the same way that it uses the real fingerprint. 
Thus, ideally, given the privacy metric h, the LP cannot distinguish the real location from 
the other h locations generated by our noise fingerprint sets, and the probability of a “luck 
guess” is 
1
h 1
. 
However, the LP may perform a distribution attack [3] based on his knowledge of 
the query probability of each AP in the whole area. The query probability of an AP 
indicates how frequently this AP was used as the search condition (real fingerprint), and 
this number is different for each AP because of the diversity of their spatial distributions 
(e.g., a public Wi-Fi-router in a mall will be used more frequently than a private home-
edition router). The LP could use this information to narrow the guessing range. In our 
system, this disturbing knowledge will be gradually degraded because of our randomized 
algorithms for choosing APs. After a period of system implementation, the query 
probability of each AP will lead to equalization and the LP will lose this weapon against 
the user. 
Finally, when in the trajectory scenario, the LP could carry out a homogeneity attack 
to infer the user's location from a continuous positioning request. In Algorithm 3, we have 
ensured that the location generated by our noise fingerprint has the same spatial continuity 
as the real fingerprint. It must be pointed out that we did not take the direction and velocity 
features of real location data into consideration because G cannot offer any spatial 
information for us to perform such an optimization. Thus, our noise trajectories may not 
have the same high-level features as the real trajectory. However, we still successfully 
strengthen the discrete noise locations and organize them in a trajectory-like spatial 
distribution. As a result, it is still difficult for the LP to recognize the real trajectory. 
6. EVALUATIONS 
LoPEC was evaluated by implementation on a smartphone with the Android 5.0 system, 
and the associated LP and LS were realized by simulation on our server. We simulate the 
MEC location service and the AP information used to calculate the location by the LP was 
collected from an urban area in the city Harbin China. We considered four aspects in our 
evaluations. 
6.1 Simulation and implementation 
As the fundamental data of our evaluation, we gathered the AP data (Wi-Fi Mac address 
and signal strength) from the real world by installing a simple program on a smartphone 
and using it to sense the surrounding Wi-Fi information. Fig.5 shows the area and the 
coordinates we gathered with Google Earth. 
 
Fig.5 Area and the coordinates we gathered APs from 
 
We chose a Wi-Fi-rich downtown business district to gather our data to obtain a better 
experimental result. For each coordinate in Fig.5, we recorded its geographic coordinate 
(in the latitude-longitude frame) and the surrounding Wi-Fi Mac addresses with their 
signal strengths (mean of 10 times for each), and we gathered 2016 Wi-Fi routers. For the 
convenience of data analysis and evaluation, we transformed the geographic coordinates 
into the Cartesian coordinate system using the Gauss-Kruger projection. 
Based on the above data, we simulated the LP on our server to provide LS for user. 
To verify the universality of LoPEC, we realized two different positioning technologies, 
introduced in [18] (RADAR) and [19] (PBL), on the server side. These two classic 
approaches outlined the fundamentals of today's third-party RF-based positioning services. 
We realized and implemented LoPEC on a Samsung smartphone with the Android 
5.0 system . LoPEC runs in the background of the OS and protects the user's location 
privacy when an LS is used. 
6.2 Quality of generated G 
We invited volunteers to collect Wi-Fi information for us by using the SCSOA. SCSOA 
ran in the background of their smartphones and generated G gradually as they shopped in 
the area shown in Fig.5. To evaluate the quality of G, we compared G with Gt to observe 
the change in quality as the number of volunteer trips increased. Here, Gt is the global 
undigraph of the area shown in Fig.5. We obtained this value using all the Wi-Fi 
information gathered in this area as the input of SCSOA. Obviously, a higher similarity 
between G and Gt means that G is of higher quality. Fig.6 shows the influence of the travel 
time t on the quality of G. 
 
Fig. 6 Quality of generated G vs. travel times 
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and the number of incorrect vertices (vertices that do 
not belong in G) as the travel time increased from 1 to 8. The result shows that SCSOA 
can generate G efficiently over time. Both the Wi-Fi-routers (vertices) and their 
overlapping relations (edges) can be well modeled in G. Moreover, the ratio of incorrect 
vertices in G is fairly small, and these incorrect vertices are probably due to  the unfixed 
Wi-Fi-routers (e.g., the portable smartphone hotspots) and the Wi-Fi-routers beyond our 
measured boundary. 
6.3 Success rate of clique noise 
We evaluated the impact of the following four parameters on the success rate of our CSDA: 
privacy metric h, clustering coefficient threshold ϵ, the scale of G and different positioning 
technologies. Fig.7 shows the evaluation results. 
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(c) x vs. scale of G with ϵ = 0.95, h = 1 
Fig.7 Effects on success rate 
The success rate x is independent of the privacy metric h (Fig.7(a)) because each 
noise fingerprint is generated independently from the others in CSDA. This feature is 
inspiring when the user needs to promote his privacy metric. x increases when the 
clustering coefficient threshold is tightened (Fig.7(b)), as higher ϵ means more strict and 
dense area filtration. In addition, x will increase as G enlarges due to the rise in G's density 
and clique number (Fig.7(c)). Furthermore, we find that x can remain at a high level (85% 
of RADAR in our experiment) even on the smallest G in our evaluation. This result 
confirmed that LoPEC could function quite well for various types of users. 
The x on RADAR outperforms x on PBL. This result is caused by the differences 
between these two positioning technologies in their data format requirements. More 
specifically, RADAR tends to use a fixed number (usually less than 5) of APs to calculate 
the coordinate; in contrast, PBL will utilize as many APs as it can. This leads to the fact 
that CSDA always has to generate a larger complete subgraph for PBL than for RADAR, 
and this will influence x. In general, CSDA can obtain a considerably high success rate in 
various conditions. 
6.4 Computational cost 
As SCSOA runs in the background in the user's smartphone and does not affect the LS 
experience, we focus our attention on CSDA and e-CSDA due to their extra time delays. 
Before our evaluation, we first introduce the brute-force algorithm for comparison. 
The brute-force algorithm will find an m-clique in an n-vertex graph by checking all Cnm 
m-subgraphs for completeness. Fig.8 shows the effects of h and different scales of G on 
the CPU time of each algorithm. 
 
(a) t vs. scale of G with h = 5 on PBL 
 
(b) t vs. h on PBL 
Fig.8 Computational cost 
In Fig.8(a), we set the privacy metric h to 5 and select 8 incremental subgraphs from 
the previous evaluation. The brute-force algorithm takes a considerably longer and very 
unstable amount of CPU time. In contrast, the computational costs of our CSDA and e-
CSDA are lower by more than an order of magnitude than that of the brute-force algorithm 
and increase linearly with the size of G. The same result is shown in Fig.8(b), where we 
perform these algorithms on a certain G and increase the privacy metric h from 3 to 20. 
In addition, our algorithms perform better on RADAR than PBL for the same reason as 
described in the above subsection. The result shows that LoPEC utilizes the randomization 
method successfully, and its computational cost is acceptable for the smartphone LS 
scenario. 
6.5 Trajectory feature of noise fingerprint 
We evaluated the trajectory feature of the noise fingerprint by performing a positioning 
experiment. We walked through the area shown in Fig.9 in a casual path (green) and sent 
a series of RF data, which was protected by our e-CSDA, and we used RADAR to 
calculate the location of each dataset. Fig.9 shows the result of this evaluation, and we 
can see clearly that our noise fingerprint (blue) has a trajectory-like spatial distribution, 
just like the real fingerprint. 
 Fig.9 Spatial distribution of Trajectory-like noise fingerprint generated by e-CSDA 
7. Conclusion 
This paper proposes LoPEC, a location privacy-preserving scheme for the mobile edge 
computing scenario. We argue that the preservation of location privacy in MEC is 
equivalent to the protection of the wireless fingerprint. Based on the good modeling of 
the AP spatial distribution, we found a way to generate high-quality noise fingerprint. 
SCOSA provides the user with a self-sufficient way to apply LoPEC without the 
assistance of a broker. Then, we proposed two randomization-based noise-addition 
algorithms: CSDA and e-CSDA. CSDA greatly reduces the computational cost of the raw 
noise generation method by utilizing the notion of the clustering coefficient and still 
retains a high success rate. The e-CSDA further protects the location privacy in the 
trajectory scenario. Evaluation results indicate that LoPEC can protect the user's location 
privacy in MEC environment. 
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